rapidly becoming the number one social policy issue in America.
President Bill Clinton stated in 1995 that "the single biggest
social problem in our society may be the growing absence of fathers
from their children's homes, because it contributes to so many other
social problems." In 1997, Congress created task forces to promote
fatherhood, and in 1998 the governors' and mayors' conferences
followed. President George W. Bush recently unveiled a $315 million
dollar package for "responsible fatherhood." Nonprofit organizations
such as the National Fatherhood Initiative were formed in the
mid-1990s. Fatherhood was seen as the most serious social problem by
almost 80% of respondents to a 1996 Gallup poll (NFI 1996, 1).
Fatherhood advocates insist that the crisis of fatherless
children is "the most destructive trend of our generation"
(Blankenhorn 1995, 1). Virtually every major social pathology has
been linked to fatherlessness: violent crime, drug and alcohol
abuse, truancy, teen pregnancy, suicideall correlate more strongly
to fatherlessness than to any other single factor. The majority of
prisoners, juvenile detention inmates, high school dropouts,
pregnant teenagers, adolescent murderers, and rapists all come from
fatherless homes (Daniels 1998; NFI 1996). The connection is so
strong that controlling for fatherlessness erases the relationships
between race and crime and between low income and crime (Kamarck and
Yet despite its salience in public policy debates and within
psychology, sociology, and law, fatherhood has received little
attention from political scientists.
This neglect is not a minor omission. Arguably it is what has
left the phenomenon unexplained. For despite a decade of attention,
little attempt has been made to account for where the fatherhood
crisis comes from in the first place. While it doubtless has a
number of contributing social and economic causes that stretch back
decades, there is evidence that the critical dimensions it has
assumed in the last decade proceed at least in part from public
policy, and that the problem should be seen less as sociological or
psychological and more as political.
What is neglected is the large governmental machinery that has
arisen at the federal, state, and local levelsand abroadto address
family issues. Extensive executive-branch agencies administer not
only welfare but child protection, child-support enforcement, and
other quasi-police functions. Yet the linchpin of this machinery is
the judiciary: the little-understood system of family courts, which
have arisen during the last 40 years. Like the fatherhood problem
itself, this apparatus is most highly developed in the Anglophone
countries, with the marked political role the common law tradition
bestows upon the judiciary and with their more extensive history of
divorce (Riley 1991). The organization varies, but virtually every
state and democratic country now has special courts and civil
service agencies for family issues (DiFonzo 1997). Fatherlessness
and the judicialbureaucratic machinery connected with it have grown
up together as increasingly worldwide phenomena.
The conventional wisdomenunciated by political leaders, media
commentators, and scholars on both left and rightassumes the
problem stems from paternal abandonment. Clinton said the fathers
pursued by his administration "have chosen to abandon their
children" (Clinton 1992). David Blankenhorn writes that "the
principal cause of fatherlessness is paternal choice . . . the
rising rate of paternal abandonment" (Blankenhorn 1995, 2223).
The little work by political scientists perpetuates this
assumption. "Husbands abandon wives and children with no looking
back," writes Cynthia Daniels (1998, 2). "Millions of men walk out
on their children," says Robert Griswold (1998, 19).
Conservatives, who have done most to call attention to
fatherlessness, also accept this explanation. Lionel Tiger writes
that men "are abandoning women. . . . It supplies much of the 50
percent divorce rate. . . . Perhaps this helps explain the
single-mother rate of over 30% of births across the industrial
world" (Tiger 1999, 5758). Leon Kass blames feminism for "male
liberationfrom domestication, from civility, from responsible
All this may seem intuitively correct, but is it true? In fact,
no government or academic study has ever shown that large numbers of
fathers are voluntarily abandoning their children.
Moreover, those studies that have addressed the question have
arrived at a rather different conclusion. In the largest federally
funded study ever undertaken on the subject, psychologist Sanford
Braver found that the "deadbeat dad" who walks out on his family and
evades child support "does not exist in significant numbers." Braver
found at least two-thirds of divorces are initiated by women.
Moreover, few of these divorces involve legal grounds, such as
desertion, adultery, or violence (Braver 1998). Other studies have
found much higher proportions, with one concluding that "who gets
the children is by far the most important component in deciding who
files for divorce" (Brinig and Allen 2000, 12627, 129, 158).
The importance of this finding cannot be overestimated.
Policymakers clearly assume the contrary, imposing punitive measures
on allegedly dissolute fathers. "Children should not have to suffer
twice for the decisions of their parents to divorce," Republican
Senator Mike DeWine stated in June 1998, "once when they decide to
divorce, and again when one of the parents evades the financial
responsibility to care for them."
Cases of unmarried fathers, usually younger and poorer, are more
difficult to document. Yet here too the evidence contrasts with the
stereotype. One study of low-income fathers ages 16-25 found that
63% had only one child; 82% had children by only one mother; 50% had
been in a serious relationship with the mother at the time of
pregnancy; only 3% knew the mother of their child "only a little";
75% visited their child in the hospital; 70% saw their children at
least once a week; 50% took their child to the doctor and large
percentages reported bathing, feeding, dressing, and playing with
their children; and 85% provided informal child support in the form
of cash or purchased goods such as diapers, clothing, and toys
(Wilson 1997). A study of low-income fathers in England found that
"the most common reason given by the fathers for not having more
contact with their children was the mothers' reluctance to let them.
. . . Most of the men were proud to be seen as competent carers and
displayed a knowledge of child-care issues" (Speak et al. 1999).
Also challenging the deadbeat stereotype, a Rutgers-Texas study
found that many fathers state governments want to track down for
child support are so destitute that their lives focus on finding the
next job, the next meal, or next night's shelter. "They struggle
with irregular, low-wage employment," the authors write. "But
economically and emotionally marginal as many of these fathers were,
they . . . continue to make contributions to their children's
households and to maintain at least a relationship with those
children" (Edin and Lein 1998).
So if fathers are not abandoning their children in record
numbers, why are so many children without fathers? Some 40% of the
nation's children and 60% of African-American children live in homes
where their fathers are not present (Popenoe 1993).
Part of the answer may be found by examining the governmental
institutions that regulate the relationships between parents and
their children. The first point of contact between most parents and
the state is again the family court and the bureaucratic machinery
that surrounds it.
Family courts are a little-studied institution, yet they possess
powers unlike any other governmental body. Unlike other courts, they
are usually closed to the public, generally leave no record of their
proceedings, and keep few statistics on their decisions, so
information is difficult to obtain. In some ways they are closer to
administrative agencies than courts; one prominent judge describes
them as a "social service delivery system." Uniquely, their mandate
is not even to administer justice as such but to determine "the best
interest of the child." Because this may involve no transgression by
litigants, family courts would appear to be the only courts that can
summon and impose their orders on citizens accused of no legal
Thus while family courts sit lowest in the judicial hierarchy,
paradoxically they are regarded as the most powerful. "The family
court is the most powerful branch of the judiciary," according to
Robert Page, presiding judge of the family part of the Superior
Court of New Jersey. By their own assessment, "The power of family
court judges is almost unlimited" (Page 1993, 11).
Perhaps most startling is that by some accounts they claim to be
exempt from the U.S. Constitution. Family courts describe themselves
as courts of "equity" or "chancery" rather than "law," implying they
are not necessarily bound by due process, and the rules of evidence
are not as stringent as in criminal courts. As one father reports
being told by the chief investigator for the administrator of the
courts in New Jersey, investigating a complaint in 1998: "The
provisions of the U.S. Constitution do not apply in domestic
relations cases since they are determined in a court of equity
rather than court of law." A connected rule, known as the "domestic
relations exception," prevents federal courts exercising
constitutional review over family law cases.
Family courts handle matters such as divorce, custody, child
support, child protection, domestic violence, and juvenile crime.
Their workload is determined by the existence of these problems, all
of which are directly connected with fatherless homes. Recalling
Dickens' observation that "the one great principle of the law is to
make business for itself," it may not be overly cynical to suggest
that family courts and their entourage have developed a vested
interest in separating children from their parents. Though mothers
and parents in intact families can also find their children
confiscated (a trend that seems to be increasing), the process most
often begins with the removal of the father, the weakest link in the
family chain (Mead 1969, 198). The children then become effectively
wards of the state, where they can be seized from their mothers as
well, often on accusations of child abuse (Hewlett and West 1998;
Like other state court judges, family court judges are elected or
appointed and promoted by commissions dominated by lawyers and other
professionals (Jacob 1964; Tarr 1999, 6170). They are political
positions, in other words, answerable to the bar associations who
effectively appoint them or finance their election campaigns and who
naturally have an interest in maximizing the volume of litigation
(Corsi 1984, 10714; Watson and Downing 1969, 98, 336). While family
courts, like all courts, complain of being overburdened, it is
clearly in their interest to be overburdened, since judicial powers
and salaries, like any other, are determined by demand. "Judges and
staff work on matters that are emotionally and physically draining
due to the quantity and quality of the disputes presented," Judge
Page explains. "They should be given every consideration for salary
and the other perks' or other emoluments of their high office." If
the judiciary is viewed in part as a business, then the more
satisfied the customersin this case, the bar associations and
divorcing parents who expect custodythe more customers will be
attracted. "With improved services more persons will come before the
court seeking their availability," writes Judge Page. "As the court
does a better job more persons will be attracted to it as a method
of dispute resolution" (Page 1993, 1920). The more attractive the
courts make divorce settlements, the more their business and the
more children will be removed from, in most cases, their fathers.
One tool at their disposal is restraining orders, which exclude
fathers (or mothers) from their children for months, years, and even
life. These orders are routinely issued during divorce proceedings,
usually without any evidence of wrongdoing. Elaine Epstein, former
president of the Massachusetts Women's Bar Association, has written
that restraining orders are doled out "like candy." "Restraining
orders and orders to vacate are granted to virtually all who apply,"
and "the facts have become irrelevant," she found. "In virtually all
cases, no notice, meaningful hearing, or impartial weighing of
evidence is to be had" (Epstein 1993, 1). The rationale was revealed
during a judges' training seminar, when municipal court judge
Richard Russell told his colleagues:
Your job is not to become concerned about the constitutional
rights of the man that you're violating as you grant a restraining
order. Throw him out on the street, give him the clothes on his
back, and tell him, see ya around. . . . We don't have to worry
about the rights. (Bleemer 1995, 1)
Professional associations and "revolving doors" connect family
courts to executive branch agencies that handle child protection and
child support enforcement. These agencies likewise can be said to
have a interest in removing children from their fathers. Judges also
wield substantial powers of patronage, whereby lucrative positions
"are generally passed out to the judge's political cronies or to
persons who can help his private practice" (Jacob 1984, 112).
The links connecting these professionals and agencies with the
courts can be glimpsed from those documented cases that cross the
line into illegality. One investigation uncovered a "slush fund"
operated by Los Angeles family court judges into which attorneys and
other "court-appointed professionals" contributed. The professionals
included court monitors, who received up to $240 a day to watch
fathers accused of spousal or child abuse while they are with their
children, raising the question of whether the payments resulted not
simply in certain individuals receiving appointments in preference
to others but in the function itself being created in the first
place (O'Meara 1999). What appears to be involved is not simply
individual bribery to favor particular individuals or cases but a
kind of systemic, institutional bribery leading to innocent fathers
being monitored. This fund may be exceptional, in that it was
exposed. But it may be exceptional only in degree, given that court
officials have more subtle methods of rewarding judges who send
business their way.
Such connections extend to the legislative branch, where the
available documentation relates mostly to criminal cases, which may
nevertheless constitute the tip of a larger, quasi-legal iceberg. In
March 2000 four Arkansas legislators, including the most powerful
member of the Arkansas Senate, were convicted on federal charges of
racketeering for taking kickbacks and arranging government contracts
for personal benefit, mostly connected with child custody and child
support. One scheme ostensibly provided legal counsel to children, a
practice that extends the patronage of judges by bringing in
additional attorneys, often at litigants' expense though in this
case with state funds voted for by lawmakers. Columnist John
Brummett of the Arkansas Democrat-Gazette wrote on April 29, 1999,
that "no child was served by that $3 million scam to set up a
program ostensibly providing legal representation to children in
custody cases, but actually providing a gravy train to selected
legislators and pals who were rushing around to set up corporations
and send big checks to each other." The program "not only sailed
through the legislature without extended comment or eligibility
restriction," as is often the case with legislation promoted for
children, "but got its insider contracts expeditiously approved at
the Arkansas Supreme Court." The offense for which the senators were
indicted was not the diverting of contracts to their own firmswhich
is apparently considered legalbut receiving personal kickbacks and
the cover-up. The underlying point here is that such opportunities
only become available once children are removed from their parents.
The largest component of government fatherhood policies is
child-support enforcement. Here too the courts, civil services
agencies, and private firms have a stake in separating children from
Nearly 60,000 agents now enforce child support throughout the
United States, about 13 times the number in the Drug Enforcement
Administration worldwide. This does not include the rapidly growing
number of private enforcement companies. Though theoretically part
of the executive branch, public agencies maintain close
relationships with family courts. David Gray Ross, head of the
federal Office of Child Support Enforcement (OCSE) in the Clinton
administration, began his career as a family court judge before
moving on to higher courts and a stint in a state legislature. "He
was honored as Judge of the Year of America' by the National
Reciprocal Family Support Enforcement Association in 1983 and as
Family Court Judge of the Nation' by the National Child Support
Enforcement Association [NCSEA] in 1989" . That these groups bestow honors upon
judges (and a federal government web site would boast about it)
indicates their financial interest in family court decisions,
primarily the one removing children from their fathers that sets the
process in motion and then the punitive child-support award that
necessitates their services. NCSEA's Internet site lists its members
as "state and local agencies, judges, court masters, hearing
officers, district attorneys, government and private attorneys,
social workers, caseworkers, advocates, and other child support
professionals," as well as "corporations that partner with
government to enforce child support" . In
other words, it includes officials from at least two branches of
government plus the private sector, who all have a financial
interest in having children separated from their fathers.
Setting child support levels is likewise a political process
dominated largely by collection personnel. About half the states use
guidelines devised by courts and executive-branch enforcement
agencies that interpret and enforce them (Morgan 1998, table 1-2).
Such legislating by courts and enforcement agencies raises questions
about the separation of powers and thus the constitutionality of the
process. The method of formulating child support guidelines,
according to a Georgia district attorney, "violates both substantive
due process and equal protection guarantees of the Constitutions of
the United States and the State of Georgia" (Akins 2000).
The review process is likewise controlled largely by enforcement
personnel. Virginia completed its review in 1999 with a commission
consisting of one part-time member representing fathers and 11
full-time lawyers, judges, child-support enforcement agents, and
representatives of other organizations who have a vested interest in
both removing children from their fathers and making the fathers'
support obligations as burdensome as possible (Koplen 1999). Georgia
commissions have comprised "individuals who are unqualified to
assess the economic validity of the guidelines, or who arguably have
an interest in maintaining the status quo, or both," Williams Akins
writes. Of the 11 members in 1998, "Two were members of the
judiciary, two represented custodial parent advocacy groups, four
were either present or former child support enforcement personnel
and two were state legislators" (Akins 2000).
These ethical conflicts extend to the private sector, where an
obvious financial interest exists in creating fatherless children.
Child-support enforcement is now a multi-billion dollar enterprise,
with claimed arrearages of up to $68 billion and growing (HHS 2001).
Privatization has created a large industry of firms with a stake in
pursuing parents, such as Policy Studies Incorporated (PSI),
SupportKids, and Lockheed Martin IMS.
These firms are also involved in setting the levels of what they
collect and so can create the very delinquents on which their
business depends. From 1983 to 1990, Robert Williams, now president
of PSI, was a paid consultant with the Department of Health and
Human Services (HHS), where he helped establish uniform guidelines
for the states with a grant from the National Center for State
Courts. During this time, a federally driven approach led to
significantly increased obligations. When the Family Support Act of
1988 required states to implement child-support guidelines (and gave
them only a few months of legislative time to do so or lose millions
in federal funds), most opted for Williams' guidelines, the model
being devised by the agency overlooking the program (Akins 2000;
Rogers and Bieniewicz 2000).
One year after joining HHS, and the same year the federal
guidelines were created, Williams started PSI, which targeted
privatization opportunities with those he had consulted. In 1996,
his company had the greatest number of child-support-enforcement
contracts of any of the private companies that held state contracts
(Johnston 1999). Company promotional literature reports that PSI
operates 31 privatized service locations in 15 states. The Denver
Business Journal reported on 27 June 1997, that PSI had grown "by
leaps and bounds because of the national crackdown on deadbeat
dads,'" even before welfare reform legislation took effect, by which
the company "stands to profit even more."
More significant than the profiteering is the level of
obligation. PSI has a vested interest not only in making the
child-support levels as high as possible to increase its absolute
collection, but also in making them so high that they create
arrearages and "delinquents." Only by creating a level of obligation
high enough to create hardship, can the guidelines create a large
enough pool of defaulters to ensure demand for collection services.
Like his public sector counterparts, Williams's business depends on
creating as many deadbeat dads as possible.
Williams's model sharply raised obligations and has been widely
criticized. Economist Mark Rogers has charged that it resulted in
"excessive burdens" based on a "flawed economic foundation."
Williams himself has stated, "There is no consensus among economists
on the most valid theoretical model to use in deriving estimates of
child-rearing expenditures," and, "Use of alternative models yields
widely divergent estimates of the percentages of parental income or
consumption allocated to the children." Donald Bieniewicz, member of
an advisory panel to OCSE, comments: "This is a shocking vote of no
confidence' in the . . . guideline by its author" (Bieniewicz 1999,
2; Rogers 1999; Williams 1994, 104105). Yet on the basis of this
guideline, parents are being arrested and jailed, usually without
The politics of fatherhood is difficult to classify according to
existing political vocabularies. It possesses similarities to a
patronage machine, wherein judgeships themselves are distributed
(Glick 1978, 510). The judge in turn sits at the center of a
distribution system where he or she is in a position to reward
friends and punish enemies. Yet the patronage wielded in family
court appears to be less partisan and more pecuniary (cp. Ashman
1973, 242; Jacob 1984, 112; Stumpf and Culver 1992, 49). The judge
who sits at the center of the machine is not necessarily in command
of it, and a judge who fails to see to the interests of the
attorneys and other professionals can be punished when the time
comes for reappointment and promotion.
What is unprecedented is the commodity in contention. Children
serve as the tool or even weapon in disputes among contending
parties, not only parents but government officials. Control of
children brings control over adults and confers power and financial
rewards on those who can successfully claim to be acting in the
children's interest (Brinig and Allen 2000, 133, 156). The politics
of fatherhood may thus be seen as part of a larger politics of
children which is only beginning to receive scrutiny (Hewlett and
West 1998; Mack 1997; MacLeod 1997). An extensive literature already
examines family politics and lays the groundwork for political
scientists to go further in understanding the developing role of the
state in family relationships (Binion 1991; Dewar 2000; Elshtain
1989; Houlgate 1998; Okin 1991). What must now be explored is what
happens when specific state institutions step in to assume control
over children and, in the name of their well-being or that of the
larger society, regulate their relationships with their parents.
1. Government fatherhood programs exist in
Canada, Britain, Australia, and New Zealand. In June 1997 the German
magazine Der Spiegel ran a cover story on "The Fatherless Society."
The problem is increasing in countries with such traditional family
morality as Japan and India (e.g., Bhadra Sinha, "No Time For Each
Other," The Times of India, 3 December 2000). References
William C. 2000. "Why Georgia's Child Support Guidelines Are
Unconstitutional," Georgia Bar Journal 6 (October).
Ashman, Charles R. 1973. The Finest Judges Money Can Buy. Los
Angeles: Nash Publishing.
Bieniewicz, Donald J. 1999. "Improving State Child Support
Guidelines." Testimony to the Virginia Child Support Quadrennial
Review Panel, Richmond.
Binion, Gayle. 1991. "On Women, Marriage, Family, and the
Traditions of Political Thought," Law and Society Review 25 (2).
Blankenhorn, David. 1995. Fatherless America: Confronting Our
Most Urgent Social Problem. New York: Basic Books.
Bleemer, Russ. 1995. "N.J. Judges Told to Ignore Rights in Abuse
TROs," New Jersey Law Journal 140 (24 April).
Braver, Sanford L., with Diane O'Connell. 1998. Divorced Dads:
Shattering the Myths. New York: Tarcher/Putnam.
Brinig, Margaret F. and Douglas W. Allen. 2000. "These Boots Are
Made for Walking: Why Most Divorce Filers are Women," American
Economics and Law Review 2 (Spring).
Clinton, Bill. 1992. Nomination acceptance speech at the
Democratic National Convention in Madison Square Garden, New York,
July 16, 1992 January 12, 2001.
Corsi, Jerome R. 1984. Judicial Politics. Englewood Cliffs, New
Daniels, Cynthia, ed. 1998. Lost Fathers: The Politics of
Fatherlessness in America. New York: St. Martin's Press.
Dewar, J. 2000. "Family Law and its Discontents," International
Journal of Law, Policy, and the Family 14 (April).
DiFonzo, J. Herbie DiFonzo. 1997. Beneath the Fault Line: The
Popular and Legal Culture of Divorce in Twentieth-Century America.
Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia.
Edin, Kathryn, and Laura Lein. 1998. Low-Income, Non-Residential
Fathers: Off-Balance in a Competitive Economy September 30, 2001.
Elshtain, Jean B. 1989. "Family, Politics, and Authority." In
Children, Parents, and Politics, ed. Geoffrey Scarre. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Epstein, Elaine M. 1993. "Speaking the Unspeakable,"
Massachusetts Bar Association Newsletter 33 (June-July).
Glick, Henry R. 1978. "The Promise and the Performance of the
Missouri Plan: Judicial Selection in Fifty States," University of
Miami Law Review 32.
Griswold, Robert L. 1998. "The History and Politics of
Fatherlessness," In Lost Fathers: The Politics of Fatherlessness in
America, ed. Cynthia Daniels. New York: St. Martin's Press.
U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. Committee on Ways and
Means. 1998. Green Book. Section 8: Child Support Enforcement
Program. Print WMCP:105-7, DOCID: f:wm007_08.105, U.S. Government
Printing Office Online via GPO Access.
(September 27, 2001).
Hewlett, Sylvia Ann, and Cornel West. 1998. The War Against
Parents. Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin.
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Fact Sheet, March
16, 2001. http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2001pres/01fssupport.html
(October 1, 2001).
Houlgate, L.D. 1998. "Must the Personal Be Political? Family Law
and the Concept of Family," International Journal of Law, Policy and
the Family 12 (1).
Jacob, Herbert. 1964. "The Effects of Institutional Differences
in the Recruitment Process: The Case of State Judges," Journal of
Public Law 13.
Jacob, Herbert. 1984. Justice in America: Courts, Lawyers, and
the Judicial Process. 4th ed. Boston and Toronto: Little Brown.
Johnston, James R. 1999. "The Father of Today's Child Support
Public Policy," Fathering Magazine. August.
http://www.fathermag.com/907/child-support/ (October 1, 2001).
Kamarck, Elaine Ciulla, and William Galston. 1990. Putting
Children First: A Progressive Family Policy for the 1990s.
Washington: Progressive Policy Institute.
Kass, Leon R. "The End of Courtship," The Public Interest.
http://www.thepublicinterest.com (March 26, 2002).
Koplen, Barry M. 1999. Minority Report. Richmond, VA: Quadrennial
Child Support Guideline Review Commission.
Mack, Dana. 1997. The Assault on Parenthood. New York: Simon and
MacLeod, Colin M. 1997. "Conceptions of Parental Autonomy,"
Politics and Society 25 (March).
Mead, Margaret. 1969. Male and Female: A Study of the Sexes in a
Changing World. New York: Dell.
Morgan, Laura W. 1998. Child Support Guidelines: Interpretation
and Application. New York: Aspen Law and Business.
NFI. 1996. Father Facts (Lancaster, Pennsylvania: National
Okin, Susan Moller. 1991. Justice, Gender, and the Family. New
York: Basic Books.
O'Meara, Kelly. 1999. "Is Justice for Sale in L.A.?" Insight 15
Page, Robert W. 1993. "Family Courts': An Effective Judicial
Approach to the Resolution of Family Disputes," Juvenile and Family
Court Journal 44 (1).
Popenoe, David. 1993. "American Family Decline, 1960-1990: A
Review and Appraisal," Journal of Marriage and the Family 55
Riley, Glenda. 1991. Divorce: An American Tradition. New York:
Oxford University Press.
Rogers, R. Mark. 1999. "Wisconsin-Style and Income Shares Child
Support Guidelines: Excessive Burdens and Flawed Economic
Foundation," Family Law Quarterly 33 (Spring).
Rogers, R. Mark, and Donald J. Bieniewicz. 2000. "Child Cost
Economics and Litigation Issues: An Introduction to Applying Cost
Shares Child Support Guidelines." Presented at the Southern Economic
Association Annual Meeting, Alexandria, VA.
Speak, Suzanne, Stuart Cameron, and Rose Gilroy. 1999. Young
Single Fathers: Participation in Fatherhood Bridges and Barriers.
London: Family Policy Studies Centre.
Stumpf, Harry P., and John H. Culver. 1992. The Politics of State
Courts. New York: Longman.
Tarr, G. Alan. 1999. Judicial Process and Judicial Policymaking.
Belmont, CA: West/Wadsworth.
Tiger, Lionel. 1999. The Decline of Males. New York: Golden
Watson, Richard A., and Rondal G. Downing. 1969. The Politics of
the Bench and the Bar. New York: John Wiley and Sons.
Wexler, Richard. 1990. Wounded Innocents: The Real Victims of the
War Against Child Abuse. Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books.
Williams, Robert G. 1994. "Implementation of the Child Support
Provisions of the Family Support Act." In Child Support and Child
Well Being, ed. Irwin Garfinkel, Sarah McLanahan, and P.K. Robins
(Washington, DC: Urban Institute Press).
Wilson, Pamela. 1997. "Helping Young Dads Succeed," Family Life
Educator, Spring 1997.